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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
;E----------------------------------------------------
:ATE OF UTAH, 
l,. 
1-
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
)H~ EARL McMILLAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15654 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, JOHN EARL McMILLAN, appeals from convictions of 
orcible Sodomy and Forcible Sexual Abuse rendered in the Third 
istrict Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Peter F. Leary 
rithout a jury and the appellant was found guilty of the crime of 
1orcible Sodomy, a Felony of the First Degree and the crime of 
1orcible Sexual Abuse, a Felony of the Third Degree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of convictions of Forcible 
3odomy and Forcible Sexual Abuse and dismissal of those charges 
Jgainst him, or in the alternative a new trial on those charges. 
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STATE:1ENT OF THE FACTS 
Among other witnesses, Marlene Harpole testified that on 
July 5, 1977, she saw her daughter, Becky (age 4), her son, Kirk 
(age 3) and two other children, Bryson (age 4) and Anson Jack (age 3; 
by a house being built near her home (T. 39-40). Mrs. Harpole 
testified that she saw a ~an bv the side of the house and i~ looked 
as if he and the children were talking. Mrs. Harpole was about 
two hundred feet from the man and could not make out his facial 
features (T. 40-41). About fifteen minutes later, t1rs. Harpole 
went over to the house being built to get her children. Mrs. HarpolE 
testified that one of the children, Anson, told her, "that man 
showed us his weenie. He let us feel it, and we tasted it and it ta: 
yukky" (T. 43). Mrs. Harpole then went to the home of Mrs. Laurie 
Jane Jack (the mother of Anson and Bryson) and told her what had 
happened. Mrs. Harpole then went home and got a piece of paper 
and a pencil and with Mrs. Jack and the children went back over 
to the house that was being built, where she wrote down the license 
plate number of a red truck she had seen at the house earlier 
(T. 43-45). Mrs. Harpole testified that she saw two people standin; 
around the truck, one of them being the man she had seen before 
(T. 45). 
Laurie Jane Jack testified that on July 5. 1977. at about 
1:30 p.m. Marlene Harpole came to her house and tolJ her that the 
children had an encounter with a man over at the house. Mrs. Jack 
2 -
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\f 
:~en called t~e children in and discussed the incident with them 
53-5-'.) ~rs. Jack then went over to the house under construction 
~~t~ ~rs Harpole and the children. Mrs. Jack testified that Bryson 
to~d her wh~ch man it was (T. 55-56). Mrs. Jack identified the 
appellant as the man Brvson pointed out to her (T. 56). Mrs. Jack 
:'-. .en cal"!.ed Russell Sanderson, a Salt Lake County Sheriff who lived 
in ~er neighborhood, and reported the incident to him. 
Russell Sanderson testified that Mrs. Jack gave him a 
oh~sical description of a suspect, a vehicle description and a 
license plate number (T. 67). The following day, July 6, 1977, Sheriff 
Sanderso~ "ent to the house under construction where he found the 
appe~lant and arrested hi~ (T. 72). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TESTI~-10NY OF MARLENE HARPOLE AND LAURIE JANE 
JACK WAS H[ARSAY EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE 
A~D ITS ADMISSION WAS A VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S 
RIGHT TO CONFRONT HIS ACCUSERS UNDER THE SIXTH 
AME~~NT OF TP.E UNITED STATES CO:lSTITUTION AND 
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The trial court allowed the witness, Marlene Harpole, to 
tes:ifv as to what the children told her about the alleged incident 
IT 43). The trial court also allowed the testimony of Laurie Jane 
Jack as to what the children told her (T. 54) over the objections of 
Jefense counsel Clearlv, this testimony was hearsay. Hearsay is 
- 3 -
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testimony offered to prove facts of which the witness has no personal 
knowledge, but which have been told to him by others. The witness 
is not testifying from his own knowledge or observation but is 
acting as a conduit to relay that of others. State v. Sibert, 6 
Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388. 
Although some courts discussed the matter under the 
terminology res gestae, courts today recognize an exception to the 
hearsay rule for certain statements made under the influence of a 
startling event. The two basic requirements of this exception to 
the hearsay rule are discussed by Professor McCormick: 
First, there must be some occurrence of event 
sufficiently startling to render normal reflective 
thought processes of an observer inoperative. 
Second, the statement of the declarant must have 
been a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence 
or event and not the result of reflective thought. 
McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, §297. 
In Cromeenes v. San Pedro, Los Angeles and Salt Lake 
Railroad Company, 37 Utah 475, 109 P.lO (1910) this Court discussed 
this exception to the hearsay rule: 
To bring the declarations of a party within the 
doctrine of res gestae, they must be connected 
with, and grow out of, the act or transaction 
which is the subject matter of the inquiry 
so as to form one continuous transaction, and must, 
in some way, elucidate, qualify, or characterize the 
act, and on a legal sense, be a part of it .... 
the test of whether or not declarations are res 
gestae is. Where the facts talking through the 
party, or the party's talk about the facts? 
Instinctiveness is the requisite, and when 
this exists the declarations are admissible. 
37 Utah 490. 
The basis for the admission of the declaration is its spontaneity 
- 4 -
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~he excite~ent suspends the declarant's powers of reflection and 
Ea~rication which leads to the vie1v that the declaration is reliable. 
This exception to the hearsay rule is recognized in Rule 
63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides: 
Evidence of a statement which is made other than 
by a witness while testifying at the hearing 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is 
hearsay evidence and inadmissable except: 
(4) a statement (a) which the judge finds 
was made while the declarant was perceiving 
the event or condition which the statement 
narrates, describes or explains, or (b) which 
the judge finds was made while the declarant was 
under the stress of a nervous excitement caused 
by such perception . 
The hearsay statements of Marlene Harpole and Laurie Jane Jack which 
the trial court allowed were not made while the declarants, the 
children, Anson and Bryson, were perceiving the event. The state-
ments made by the children to Mrs. Harpole were made ten to fifteen 
minutes after the alleged incident. Nor was there any indication 
that the children were under the stress of a nervous excitement caused 
by such perception to allow the hearsay evidence to come in under 
this exception. In fact, Mrs. Jack had to call the children in 
from play and at that point elicited the statements from them (T. 53). 
In State v. Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354, 495 P.2d 270 (1972) 
this Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that a statement was 
inadmissible as a spontaneous explanation where the conditions of 
stress of a nervous excitement caused by such perception were absent. 
496 P.2d at 274. 
- 5 -
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In Langford v. State, 312 So.2d 65 (Alabama 1975), the 
Court considered a case quite similar to the one at hand. The 
defendant was convicted of abusing a girl under the age of twelve 
years, in the attempt to have carnal knowledge of her. The trial 
court allowed the mother of the alleged victim to testify what the 
child told the mother soon after the mother first saw her after the 
alleged occurrence. The Court ruled that the adMission of the 
mother's testimony was improper as it did not come under the spon-
taneous exclamation exception: 
Little fault can be found in an assumption that 
the child was excited at the time of her statements 
to her mother, apparently twenty or thirty minutes 
after the alleged crime, but s•.1ch assumption could 
be based solely upon a concept of usual natural 
reactions to such an offense. There was no effort 
by the State to show her excitement, which could 
have been easily shown, if there Has any. He 
are unwilling to state that the natural and normal 
disposition of such victims under any and all 
circumstances, including as in this case injury, 
while being examined promptly thereafter by a 
physician, is always sufficient to show an 
extension for any substantial measured length 
of time of excitement or instinctiveness in a 
particular individual as distinguished from 
deliberation. This case, as bad as it is, does 
not fall within any special category of rape or 
sexual abuse of children that relieves the State 
of the duty of showing by some evidence, if it can, 
special circUMstances that warrant the application 
of a special rule of inclusion, which is an exception 
to a general rule of exclusion. 
Our conclusion that the statements of the girl 
do not Meet the test of soontaneitv does not 
offend any principle that· such decision should 
be largely left to the discretion of the trial 
judge. On the other hand, it finds support in the 
fact that apparently neither the State nor the 
trial court took the position that the evidence 
- 6 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Nas admissible as constituting a part of the 
res gestae or a spontaneous exclamation. The 
trial judge stated, "If it goes to a complaint 
about the incident it is admissible. If it 
goes to something else I will sustain it. I 
will just have to hear it, and exclude it if 
it is not proper. 
The hearsay rule, which has long been recognized and respected 
b·; '-:irtually every state, is based on experience and grounded in the 
notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the 
triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded 
because they lack the indicia of reliability: they are usually 
not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker 
:,;ith the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not 
subject to cross-examination; and he is not available in order that 
his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the trier of fact. 
Chambers v. :--!ississippi, 410 U.S. 298, 35 L. Ed. 2d 310, 311. 
The Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the 
witnesses against him is a fundamental right, essential to a fair 
trial, and is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. A major reason underlying the Constitutional Confrontation 
Rule is to give a defendant charged with a crime an opportunity to 
cross-examine the witnesses against him. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400, 13 L.Ed. 2d 923, 85 S.Ct. 1065 (1965). 
Appellant was denied his constitutional right to cross-
examine the witnesses against him when the court admitted the hearsay 
:est imon ·r of :-1ar lene Harpole and Laurie Jane Jack. :--Irs. Harpole 
testified as to what Anson Jack told her of the incident (T. 43). 
- 7 -
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The declarant, Anson, was not a witness, and could therefore not 
be cross-examined as to his statement. 
The only identification of appellant was by the witness, 
Laurie Jane Jack and was a hearsay identification. Laurie Jane Jack 
testified that the day of the incident she asked Bryson Jack which 
man had committed the offense, and Bryson pointed out appellant 
(T. 55-56). At the trial, Bryson could not identifv the appellant 
Q. [MR. MARSON) Now, did your morn ask you about the 
man? 
A. [BRYSON JACK) Yes, she said, "Is that the man?" I 
said, "Yes." 
MR. JOHNSTON: Objection to that and request it to be 
stricken, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Hell -
MR. JOHNSTON: \.Jhat was said is hearsay. 
THE COURT: I think you ought to lay a foundation 
as to identification, please. 
MR. MARSON: Your Honor, this witness cannot identify 
the defendant. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. (T. 31) 
Since the statements of Marlene Harpole and Laurie Jane 
Jack concerning what the children told them about the alleged incider 
and the identification of appellant by Laurie Jane Jack were hearsay 
statements and the statements do not meet the conditions which woulc 
allow them to come in under the exception to the Hearsav Rule 
63(4)(b), the statements were inadmissible as evidence The adrnissi 
of the hearsay statrnents was unconstitutional as it denied a?pellant 
- 8 -
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the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WITNESS, 
BRYSON JACK WAS COMPETENT TO TESTIFY. 
Ctah Code Ann. §78-24-2 (1953 as amended) provides: 
The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
(2) children under ten years of age, who 
appear incapable of receiving just impressions 
of the facts respecting which they are examined, 
or of relating them truly. 
In regard to testamentary capacity, it is admitted that a child of 
any age can testify if they meet certain qualifications. In State 
v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965) the Court discussed 
those qualifications: 
\-.That is essential is that it appears that the child 
has sufficient intelligence and maturity that she is 
able to understand the questions put to her; that 
she has some knowledge of the subject under inquiry 
and the facts involved therein; that she is able 
to remember what happened; and that she has a sense 
of moral duty to tell the truth. 
Appellant submits that the witness, Bryson Jack, was not adequately 
qualified as a witness and was not competent to testify. Bryson Jack's 
incompetence as a witness appears from consideration of the whole of 
his testimony. 
On cross-examination, the witness, Bryson Jack, contra-
dieted the testimonv he gave on direct examination saying what he 
told the Court was not true 
Q Brvson, vou've told the Judge that you tasted 
somebody's w~enie. 
- 9 -
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A. I know. 
Q. Now, that isn't true; is it, Bryson? 
A. Uh-uh. 
Q. It isn't true; is it? 
A. Uh-uh; not true. 
Q. It isn't true; is it, son? 
A. Uh-uh. 
Q. I have nothing further. (T. 35) 
And again, on recross-examination: 
BY MR. JOHNSTON: 
Q. Bryson 
A. What? 
Q. --it's true, isn't it, that you didn't taste 
the man's weenie? 
MR. MARSON: Your Honor, could I ask Mr. Johnston 
to rephrase that question? I understand this is 
cross-examination, but conceptually we're dealing 
with a difficult type of question; "It's true, 
isn't it." If we could be rather straightforward 
with this child I think it would be helpful. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Johnston) That's true, isn't it? 
A. Uh-uh. 
tm. MARSON: Your Honor, I'd like to object again. 
THE COURT: The objection as to the form of the 
question will be sustained. 
MR. MARSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Wait a 
minute, Bryson. 
Q. (By Mr. Johnston) Bryson 
- 10 -
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A. \.Jhat? 
Q. --Becky didn't taste the weenie; did she? 
A. L"h-uh. 
Q. She didn't, now, did she, Bryson? 
A. :-lo. 
~ffi. MARSON Your Honor, again, I wish 
be straightfon.;ard. I don't think the 
understands the two double negatives. 
saving yes to the fact that she did. 
he could 
child 
He's 
THE COURT· Rephrase the question, please. 
Q. (By Mr. Johnston) Bryson--
A. \.Jhat? 
Q. --Becky didn't taste the weenie; did she? 
A. No. (T. 37-38). 
~or did Bryson appear capable of understanding some of the questions 
put to him bv counsel: 
Q. (Bv Mr. Johnston) Bryson, do you go to 
church? 
A. Yes. 
Q. \.Jhat church do you go to? 
A. Go down to the church. 
Q. Okay. Are you a member of a religion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. \.Jhat religion are you a member of? 
A. Mv teacher. 
Q Your teacher? 
A. Yes. 
- 11 -
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Q. Do vou know what religion you're a 
member of? 
A. No. 
Q. How often do you go to church, son? 
A. Just every day. 
Q. Every day? 
A. After school. 
Q. Every day after school? 
A. Yes. (T. 34-35) 
Or by the Court: 
THE COURT: Now, in addition to your morn talking 
to you about telling the truth, has anybody else 
talked to you about telling the truth? 
BRYSON JACK: Yes. 
THE COURT: And who might that be? 
BRYSON JACK: My morn. (T. 19-20). 
Appellant submits that the contradictory testimony of the 
witness and his inability to understand questions put to him rendere: 
the witness, Bryson Jack, incompetent to testify. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the admission of 
the hearsay evidence and the ruling that Bryson Jack was competent 
to testify was error and should result in a dismissal of the charges 
- 12 -
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against him or in the alternative, a new trial on those charges. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Attorney for Appellant 
- 13 -
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